414 Pages · 7.24 mb ·
Politics
- Advances in Political Economy (Page 1) - Introduction (Page 1) - Further Reading on Political Economy (Page 1) - Contents (Page 1) - Contributors (Page 1) - Part I: Institutions (Page 35) - Transaction Cost Politics in the Map of the New Institutionalism (Page 36) - 1 Introduction (Page 36) - 2 New Institutionalism: An Overview into the Social Sciences (Page 38) - 2.1 Definitions of Institutions (Page 38) - 2.2 Institutional Approaches (Page 39) - 3 Rational Choice-Institutionalism and New Institutional Economics (Page 43) - 3.1 Rational Choice Institutionalism (Page 43) - 3.2 New Institutional Economics (Page 45) - 4 Transaction Cost Politics (Page 47) - 5 High Transaction Costs in Political Exchange (Page 51) - 6 A Case-Study: The Governance of Political Transactions in Congress (Page 53) - 7 Constitutional Political Economy and Transaction Cost Politics (Page 55) - 8 Conclusion (Page 56) - References (Page 58) - Political Transitions in Ancient Greece and Medieval Italy: An Analytic Narrative (Page 63) - 1 Introduction (Page 63) - 2 Political Transitions in Ancient Greece (Page 65) - 2.1 Athens (Page 67) - 2.1.1 Solon, 594BC (Page 67) - 2.1.2 Kleisthenes, 508BC (Page 67) - 2.1.3 Ephialtes, 462BC (Page 70) - 3 Political Transitions in Medieval Venice and Genoa (Page 71) - 3.1 Venice (Page 71) - 3.2 Genoa (Page 73) - 4 Final Remarks (Page 75) - References (Page 76) - A Collective-Action Theory of Fiscal-Military State Building (Page 78) - 1 Formal Model (Page 81) - 1.1 The Game (Page 81) - 1.1.1 Timing (Page 82) - 1.1.2 Payoffs (Page 83) - 1.2 Equilibrium (Page 84) - 1.3 Investment in fiscal centralization (Page 86) - 1.4 Implications (Page 88) - 2 Historical Evidence (Page 89) - 2.1 England (Page 90) - 2.2 Colonial Mexico (Page 91) - 3 Conclusion (Page 93) - References (Page 94) - Stable Constitutions in Political Transition (Page 98) - 1 Introduction (Page 98) - 1.1 Related Literature (Page 101) - 1.2 Outline of the Paper (Page 102) - 2 The Model (Page 102) - 2.1 Freely Negotiating a New Constitution (Page 104) - 2.2 Negotiating a Constitution in the Presence of c (Page 105) - 2.3 Optimal Constitutions (Page 107) - 3 Static Constitutional Choice (Page 108) - 3.1 M and L Negotiate on Constitutional Reform (Page 109) - 3.1.1 Case wM>w (Page 109) - 3.1.2 Case wM<=w (Page 110) - 3.2 R and M Negotiate on Constitutional Reform (Page 111) - 3.2.1 Case wM>w (Page 111) - 3.2.2 Case wM<=w (Page 112) - 3.3 Other Cases (Page 112) - 4 A Model of Intertemporal Constitutional Choice (Page 113) - 5 Application to Different Experiences of Political Transition (Page 115) - 6 Further Discussion (Page 117) - Appendix (Page 118) - References (Page 119) - Quandaries of Gridlock and Leadership in US Electoral Politics (Page 121) - 1 Introduction (Page 121) - 2 Activist Politics (Page 127) - 2.1 The Logic of the Argument (Page 127) - 2.2 Modeling Elections (Page 129) - 3 An Outline of the Model (Page 136) - 4 Post 2008 Election (Page 143) - 4.1 Impact of the `Citizens United' Decision in 2010 (Page 146) - 5 Implications of the 2010 Election (Page 147) - 5.1 Gridlock in the 112th Congress (Page 150) - 6 Conclusion and 2012 (Page 152) - References (Page 154) - Sub-central Governments and Debt Crisis in Spain over the Period 2000-2011 (Page 158) - 1 Introduction (Page 158) - 2 What Are the Main Factors Influencing the Evolution of Sub-central Debt that Are Being Emphasized in the Literature? (Page 160) - 3 The Evolution of Sub-central and Central Debt in Spain Before the World Financial Crash (Page 163) - 4 What Has Happened with Sub-central, as well as, Central Debt in Spain After the World Financial Crash? (Page 167) - 5 Concluding Remarks (Page 170) - References (Page 171) - Deciding How to Choose the Healthcare System (Page 174) - 1 Introduction (Page 174) - 1.1 Buchanan and Tullock (Page 175) - 1.2 Rawls (Page 177) - 1.3 Kornai and Eggleston (Page 178) - 2 Actors: The "Society" and the "Patient" (Page 179) - 2.1 The Ex-ante Rawlsian Principal (Page 180) - 2.2 Interim Principal-The Policy-Setting Body (Page 181) - 2.3 Ex-post Principal at the Contract Implementation Stage (Page 183) - 3 Health-Related Technology and Costs to Actors (Page 184) - 3.1 Extra Cost of Delivering Health Care as Emergency Care (Page 184) - 3.2 Marginal Costs of Healthcare Are Increasing (Page 185) - 3.3 Is Consumption of Healthcare Peculiar? (Page 186) - 4 Health Policy Choice: Entitlement Versus Market (Insurance-)Based Contracts (Page 187) - 4.1 The Model (Page 188) - 4.2 The Median Voter Theorem and Majoritarian Taxation (Page 189) - 4.3 Median Preferences on Healthcare Policy (Page 190) - 5 Analysis (Page 191) - 6 Alternate Coalitions (Page 192) - 7 Conclusion (Page 193) - References (Page 194) - Part II: Modelling (Page 196) - Challenges to the Standard Euclidean Spatial Model (Page 197) - 1 Introduction (Page 197) - 2 Concerns About the Loss Function (Page 198) - 3 Concerns About Convexity of Preferences (Page 199) - 4 Concerns About Separability of Preferences (Page 202) - 5 Discussion (Page 204) - References (Page 206) - A Non-existence Theorem for Clientelism in Spatial Models (Page 209) - 1 Introduction (Page 209) - 2 Theories of Clientelism (Page 210) - 3 Actors and Utility Functions (Page 212) - 4 Clientelistic Instability (Page 217) - 5 Discussion (Page 220) - Theoretical Appendix (Page 224) - 6.1 Proof of Lemma 2 for the Case GP <=12 (Page 224) - 6.2 Lemma 3 and the Ideological Swing Voter (Page 224) - 6.3 Proof of Lemma 2 for the Case GP > 12 (Page 228) - 6.4 Proof of Proposition 1 (Page 228) - References (Page 229) - Nonseparable Preferences and Issue Packaging in Elections (Page 230) - 1 Introduction (Page 230) - 2 Spatial Competition and the Number of Issues (Page 231) - 3 The Strategy of Issue Packaging (Page 232) - 4 Do Voters Have Nonseparable Preferences? (Page 237) - 5 Conclusion (Page 240) - References (Page 241) - When Will Incumbents Avoid a Primary Challenge? Aggregation of Partial Information About Candidates' Valence (Page 243) - 1 Introduction (Page 243) - 2 Previous Theories of the Adoption of Primary Elections (Page 246) - 3 General Election Between the Two Parties (Page 247) - 3.1 Parties (Page 247) - 3.2 Candidates (Page 248) - 3.3 The General Electorate (Page 249) - 3.4 Timing and Solution Concept (Page 249) - 3.5 Results of the General Election (Page 250) - 4 The Nomination Process (Page 251) - 4.1 Party Members Versus Party Leaders (Page 252) - 4.2 Primary Election Versus Elite Endorsement (Page 253) - 4.3 Insiders Versus Outsiders (Page 253) - 4.4 Timing (Page 254) - 5 The Benefit of Primary Elections (Page 254) - 5.1 Primaries as a Mechanism to Reveal Information (Page 255) - 5.2 Primary Voters Update Their Beliefs (Page 256) - 5.3 What Makes Primaries More Appealing? (Page 258) - 6 The Cost of Primary Elections (Page 261) - 7 The Optimal Selection of a CSM (Page 262) - 7.1 Comparative Statics (Page 263) - 8 Conclusions and Discussion (Page 266) - Appendix with the Proofs (Page 267) - A.1 Proof of Theorem 1 (Page 267) - A.2 Proof of Lemma 1 (Page 267) - A.3 Proof of Theorem 2 (Page 269) - A.4 Proof of Lemma 2 (Page 269) - A.5 Proof of Lemma 3 (Page 270) - A.6 Proof of Lemma 4 (Page 271) - A.7 Proof of Lemma 5 (Page 271) - A.8 Proof of Theorem 3 (Page 271) - A.9 Proof of Theorem 4 (Page 271) - A.10 Proof of Theorem 5 (Page 272) - References (Page 272) - Measuring the Latent Quality of Precedent: Scoring Vertices in a Network (Page 274) - 1 Inferring Quality from Network Data (Page 275) - 2 Measuring the Quality of Precedent (Page 277) - Differentiating Cases: Community Structure (Page 278) - Data (Page 278) - 3 Results (Page 279) - 3.1 Top 100 Opinions Since 1946 (Page 280) - 3.2 Top 100 Opinions Since 1800 (Page 282) - 3.3 Probing IIA: Top 204 Opinions Since 1800 (Page 284) - 4 Conclusion (Page 284) - References (Page 286) - Part III: Empirical Analysis (Page 288) - The Politics of Austerity: Modeling British Attitudes Towards Public Spending Cuts (Page 289) - 1 Theoretical Perspectives (Page 291) - Data Sources (Page 295) - 2 Model Specification (Page 295) - 2.1 Public Support for the Cuts (Page 295) - 3 Voting Intentions and Feelings About David Cameron (Page 298) - 4 Public Reactions to the Budget Cuts (Page 299) - 5 Analyzing Attitudes Towards the Budget Cuts (Page 301) - 6 Analyzing Support for the Conservatives and David Cameron (Page 303) - 7 Why Are There so Many Bears in Britain? (Page 305) - 8 Conclusion: Economic Crisis and Performance Politics (Page 309) - References (Page 310) - Modeling Elections with Varying Party Bundles: Applications to the 2004 Canadian Election (Page 312) - 1 Introduction (Page 312) - 2 The Formal Stochastic Model (Page 315) - 3 Estimation Strategies Given Varying Party Bundles (Page 322) - 4 Application to Canadian Elections (Page 325) - 5 Conclusion (Page 334) - Appendix (Page 335) - References (Page 337) - Spatial Model of Elections in Turkey: Tracing Changes in the Party System in the 2000s (Page 339) - 1 Introduction (Page 339) - 2 Spatial Model of Elections (Page 341) - 3 2007 Elections in Turkey (Page 342) - 4 Comparison with Previous Elections (Page 349) - Appendix 1: Survey Questions (Page 350) - Vote Choice (Page 350) - Secularism (Page 350) - Nationalism (Page 351) - Demographic Characteristics (Page 351) - Appendix 2: Factor Loadings (Page 351) - References (Page 351) - Do Competitive Districts Necessarily Produce Centrist Politicians? (Page 353) - 1 Evaluating Conventional Wisdom About the Effects of District Composition on Party Convergence Among the Members of the U.S. Congress (Page 353) - 2 Ideological Extremism in the U.S. House, 1956-2004, by Party and by Democratic Presidential Vote in the District (Page 359) - 3 Ideological Extremism in the U.S. Senate, 1956-2004, by Party and by Presidential Vote in the State (Page 365) - 4 Discussion (Page 367) - References (Page 370) - A Heteroscedastic Spatial Model of the Vote: A Model with Application to the United States (Page 373) - 1 Introduction (Page 373) - 2 Voting with Biased Perceptions of Candidate Positions (Page 375) - 3 A Motivating Example to Describe Magnification (Assimilation and Contrast) in Policy Distances (Page 378) - 4 A Heteroscedastic Proximity Voting Model (Page 380) - 4.1 Explaining the Effect of Candidate Extremity on Proximity Voting (Page 384) - 4.2 Explaining the Effect of Valence on Proximity Voting (Page 384) - 4.3 Attention to News and Ideological Distance (Page 386) - 5 Concluding Remarks (Page 387) - References (Page 388) - Inferring Ideological Ambiguity from Survey Data (Page 391) - 1 Introduction (Page 391) - 2 Survey Data and Ambiguity Measurement (Page 392) - 2.1 Interpreting Respondent Disagreement (Page 392) - 2.2 Interpreting Missing Values (Page 393) - 3 A Model (Page 394) - 3.1 Model for Missing Data (Page 396) - 3.2 Prior Distributions (Page 396) - 4 Parameter Estimation (Page 397) - 5 Application: Ideological Ambiguity and Electoral Performance (Page 399) - 6 Discussion (Page 402) - References (Page 403) - Biographies (Page 405) - 1 Editors' Biographies (Page 405) - 2 Biographies of Contributors (Page 406)