International Law and International Relations

Table of contents

- 0521861861 (Page 1)
- Half-title (Page 3)
- Series title (Page 4)
- Title (Page 5)
- Copyright (Page 6)
- Contents (Page 7)
- Contributors (Page 11)
- Abstracts (Page 15)
- Preface (Page 31)
- Editors’ Note (Page 39)
- PART I INTERNATIONAL REGIMES THEORY: DOES LAW MATTER? (Page 41)
- 1 Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables (Page 43)
- DEFINING REGIMES AND REGIME CHANGE (Page 43)
- DO REGIMES MATTER? (Page 46)
- EXPLANATIONS FOR REGIME DEVELOPMENT (Page 50)
- 1. Egoistic Self-Interest (Page 50)
- 2. Political Power (Page 51)
- a. Power in the Service of the Common Good (Page 51)
- b. Power in the Service of Particular Interests (Page 52)
- 3. Norms and Principles (Page 53)
- 4. Usage and Custom (Page 55)
- 5. Knowledge (Page 56)
- CONCLUSION (Page 57)
- 2 The Demand for International Regimes (Page 58)
- 1. SYSTEMIC CONSTRAINT-CHOICE ANALYSIS: VIRTUES AND LIMITATIONS (Page 60)
- 2. THE CONTEXT AND FUNCTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (Page 64)
- 3. ELEMENTS OF A THEORY OF THE DEMAND FOR INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (Page 69)
- The Demand for Agreements and the Demand for Regimes (Page 69)
- International Regimes and Transactions Costs (Page 72)
- The Demand for Specific Information (Page 75)
- PART II COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE (Page 81)
- 3 Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations (Page 83)
- THREE PERSPECTIVES ON DEMOCRATIC COMMITMENTS (Page 86)
- THE THEORETICAL BASES FOR DEMOCRATIC DISTINCTIVENESS (Page 88)
- The Stability of Foreign Policy in Liberal Democratic States (Page 88)
- The Stability of Public Preferences (Page 88)
- The Stability of Democratic Leadership (Page 90)
- The Stability of Democratic Institutions (Page 91)
- The Distinctive Preferences of Liberal Democracies (Page 91)
- The Role of Law in Liberal Democracy (Page 92)
- Democratic Interdependence (Page 93)
- The Institutional Resources for Democratic Commitments (Page 93)
- The Multiple Levels of Democratic Domestic Politics (Page 93)
- The Transparency of Democratic Domestic Politics (Page 94)
- EMPIRICAL SOUNDINGS: DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE BEHAVIOR (Page 96)
- The Data: Measuring Democracy and Measuring Alliances (Page 98)
- International Alliance Behavior and Democratic States (Page 99)
- The Duration of Alliances (Page 101)
- CONCLUSIONS (Page 103)
- 4 On Compliance (Page 105)
- BACKGROUND ASSUMPTION (Page 106)
- Efficiency (Page 108)
- Interests (Page 109)
- NORMS (Page 114)
- VARIETIES OF NONCOMPLYING BEHAVIOR (Page 116)
- AMBIGUITY (Page 117)
- CAPABILITY (Page 120)
- The Temporal Dimension (Page 122)
- ACCEPTABLE LEVELS OF COMPLIANCE (Page 124)
- DETERMINING THE ACCEPTABLE COMPLIANCE LEVEL (Page 128)
- CONCLUSION (Page 130)
- 5 Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation? (Page 132)
- THE MANAGERIAL THESIS (Page 133)
- THE ENDOGENEITY AND SELECTION PROBLEMS (Page 135)
- DISCUSSION (Page 139)
- The Rarity of Deep Cooperation (Page 141)
- The Causes and Cures of Noncompliance (Page 145)
- ENFORCEMENT AND THE FUTURE OF COOPERATION (Page 149)
- PART III LEGALIZATION AND ITS LIMITS (Page 153)
- 6 The Concept of Legalization (Page 155)
- THE VARIABILITY OF LEGALIZATION (Page 156)
- THE DIMENSIONS OF LEGALIZATION (Page 162)
- Obligation (Page 162)
- Precision (Page 164)
- Delegation (Page 167)
- CONCLUSION (Page 169)
- 7 Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate and Transnational (Page 171)
- A TYPOLOGY OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION (Page 173)
- Independence: Who Controls Adjudication? (Page 174)
- Access: Who Has Standing? (Page 177)
- Legal Embeddedness: Who Controls Formal Implementation? (Page 180)
- Two Ideal Types: Interstate and Transnational Dispute Resolution (Page 182)
- THE POLITICS OF LITIGATION AND COMPLIANCE: FROM INTERSTATE TO JUDICIAL POLITICS (Page 184)
- The Interstate and Transnational Politics of Judicial Independence (Page 184)
- The Interstate and Transnational Politics of Access (Page 184)
- The Interstate and Transnational Politics of Embeddedness (Page 187)
- THE INTERSTATE AND TRANSNATIONAL DYNAMICS OF LEGALIZATION (Page 189)
- The Dynamics of Interstate Third-party Dispute Resolution (Page 190)
- The Dynamics of Transnational Dispute Resolution (Page 191)
- Beyond Formalism: The Dynamics of GATT and the WTO (Page 193)
- Conclusion (Page 195)
- 8 Legalization, Trade Liberalization, and Domestic Politics: A Cautionary Note (Page 197)
- LEGALIZATION, INFORMATION, AND THE MOBILIZATION OF DOMESTIC GROUPS (Page 199)
- The Logic of Mobilization (Page 199)
- Mobilizing Antitrade Groups (Page 203)
- Mobilizing Export Groups (Page 208)
- TIGHTLY BINDING TRADE RULES (Page 212)
- The Logic of "Bindingness" (Page 212)
- Exceptions and Escape Clauses (Page 216)
- Dispute Settlement (Page 220)
- CONCLUSION (Page 225)
- 9 Alternatives to "Legalization": Richer Views of Law and Politics (Page 228)
- A RICHER VIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Page 229)
- Three Lacunae (Page 231)
- Custom (Page 231)
- Defining Characteristics of Law (Page 232)
- Law as Process (Page 235)
- WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES LAW MAKE? (Page 237)
- CONCLUSION (Page 241)
- PART IV INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL NORMS (Page 243)
- 10 Quasi-States, Dual Regimes, and Neoclassical Theory: International Jurisprudence and the Third World (Page 245)
- PRACTICE AND THEORY (Page 245)
- CIVIL REGIMES (Page 247)
- DECOLONIZATION (Page 250)
- QUASI-STATES (Page 252)
- JURIDICAL STATEHOOD IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Page 255)
- A NEW DUAL CIVIL REGIME (Page 258)
- JURIDICAL STATEHOOD AND INTERNATIONAL THEORY (Page 263)
- Classical Theory (Page 263)
- Rationalism (Page 265)
- Realism (Page 266)
- Revolutionism (Page 268)
- CONCLUSION (Page 271)
- 11 Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the "Failure" of Internationalism (Page 273)
- ON NORMS (Page 276)
- ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE (Page 279)
- NORMS AND ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE IN WORLD WAR II (Page 280)
- Macrocorrelation (Page 281)
- Measuring Norms (Page 281)
- Measuring Organizational Cultures (Page 285)
- Predictions Versus Outcomes (Page 288)
- Microassessment of Causal Mechanisms (Page 288)
- British Submarine Warfare (Page 290)
- How Norms Matter (Page 294)
- Constituting Heinous Warfare (Page 294)
- Restricting Preparations (Page 295)
- Influencing Third-Party Reactions (Page 296)
- Gaining Advantage (Page 296)
- Signaling Intentions (Page 297)
- CONCLUSION (Page 298)
- 12 The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of Force (Page 299)
- INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES FROM THE SEVENTEENTH TO THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY (Page 300)
- THE EVOLUTION OF THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY NORM SINCE 1945 (Page 305)
- General Legal and Declaratory Developments (Page 305)
- Territorial Aggressions Since 1946: International Responses and Outcomes (Page 307)
- The Boundaries of Successor States (Page 316)
- Overview of Stages in the Development of the Norm (Page 318)
- ROOTS OF THE NEW TERRITORIAL ORDER (Page 319)
- CONCLUSION (Page 328)
- PART V TREATY DESIGN AND DYNAMICS (Page 331)
- 13 Why Are Some International Agreements Informal? (Page 333)
- SELF-HELP AND THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT (Page 340)
- WHAT DO TREATIES DO? (Page 346)
- RATIONALES FOR INFORMAL AGREEMENTS (Page 352)
- Speed and Obscurity (Page 352)
- Uncertainty and Renegotiation (Page 354)
- HIDDEN AGREEMENTS (Page 358)
- THE STATUS OF TACIT AGREEMENTS (Page 361)
- CHOOSING BETWEEN TREATIES AND INFORMAL AGREEMENTS (Page 365)
- CONCLUSION: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION BY INFORMAL AGREEMENT (Page 370)
- 14 The Politics of Dispute Settlement Design: Explaining Legalism in Regional Trade Pacts (Page 371)
- DEFINING THE SPECTRUM: FROM DIPLOMACY TO LEGALISM (Page 373)
- THE ARGUMENT (Page 377)
- Policy Discretion (Page 377)
- Treaty Compliance (Page 378)
- Assessing the Trade-off (Page 380)
- THE DATA SET (Page 383)
- OVERVIEW OF REGIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (Page 390)
- MEASURING ASYMMETRY AND PROPOSED INTEGRATION (Page 397)
- ASYMMETRY, PROPOSED INTEGRATION, AND LEGALISM (Page 401)
- CONCLUSION (Page 410)
- APPENDIX A: SOURCES FOR TREATY TEXTS (Page 412)
- APPENDIX B: EXCLUDED REGIONAL ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS, 1957–95 (Page 413)
- Nonreciprocal Agreements (Page 413)
- Cooperation or Framework Agreements (Page 414)
- Unavailable Agreements (Page 414)
- 15 Loosening the Ties that Bind: A Learning Model of Agreement Flexibility (Page 415)
- MODEL: LEARNING ABOUT THE WORKINGS OF AN AGREEMENT (Page 417)
- Assumptions (Page 418)
- Basics of the Model (Page 419)
- Notation (Page 422)
- Two-Period Game (Page 424)
- Timeline (Page 424)
- Equilibrium (Page 425)
- Comparative Statics (Page 426)
- NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (Page 430)
- Background and Substance of the Agreement (Page 431)
- Duration and Renegotiation: The Role of Uncertainty (Page 432)
- Duration and Renegotiation: The Compromise (Page 436)
- Resolving the Uncertainty Through Learning (Page 438)
- CONCLUSION (Page 441)
- 16 Driving with the Rearview Mirror: On the Rational Science of Institutional Design (Page 443)
- ALTERNATIVES TO RATIONAL DESIGN (Page 446)
- Alternatives to "Rational" (Page 446)
- The Logic of Appropriateness (Page 447)
- On Uncertainty (Page 449)
- Alternatives to "Design" (Page 451)
- No Designer? (Page 452)
- No Intentionality? (Page 454)
- No Choice? (Page 456)
- BROADENING THE SCIENCE OF INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN (Page 458)
- Institutional Effectiveness (Page 460)
- Normative Desirability (Page 461)
- CONCLUSION (Page 463)
- 17 The Dynamics of International Law: The Interaction of Normative and Operating Systems (Page 466)
- INTERNATIONAL LAW AS OPERATING AND NORMATIVE SYSTEMS (Page 467)
- Operating System (Page 468)
- The Normative System (Page 472)
- CORRELATES OF OPERATING SYSTEM CHANGE (Page 475)
- The Necessity of Necessity (Page 475)
- The Impetus of Political Shocks (Page 477)
- The Role of Leading States (Page 479)
- Domestic Political Influences (Page 482)
- ILLUSTRATING THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE OPERATING AND THE NORMATIVE SYSTEMS: THE CASE OF THE GENOCIDE NORM (Page 483)
- The Genocide Norm (Page 484)
- Jurisdiction (Page 485)
- Institutions (Page 487)
- Subjects/Actors in International Law (Page 491)
- CONCLUSION (Page 493)
- PART VI LAW AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS (Page 495)
- 18 Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration (Page 497)
- A RETURN TO NEOFUNCTIONALISM (Page 500)
- Neofunctionalism in historical perspective: a theory of political integration (Page 501)
- Neofunctionalism as a theory of the integration process: overcoming national barriers (Page 502)
- The actors: circumventing the state (Page 502)
- The motives: instrumental self-interest (Page 503)
- The process: incremental expansion (Page 503)
- The context: nominally apolitical (Page 504)
- A NEOFUNCTIONALIST JURISPRUDENCE (Page 505)
- Actors: a specialized national and supranational community (Page 506)
- Motives: the self-interest of judges, lawyers, and professors (Page 508)
- Giving individual litigants a personal stake in community law (Page 509)
- Courting the national courts (Page 512)
- Reciprocal Empowerment (Page 514)
- Process (Page 515)
- Functional spillover: the logic of law (Page 515)
- Political spillover: "transnational incrementalism" (Page 517)
- Upgrading common interests (Page 518)
- Context: the (apparent) separation of law and politics (Page 519)
- Maintaining the Fiction (Page 520)
- Transforming the political into the legal (Page 522)
- Law as a mask (Page 523)
- [CONCLUSION] (Page 524)
- 19 The European Court of Justice, National Governments, and Legal Integration in the European Union (Page 526)
- THE LEGAL POLITICS GAME IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (Page 529)
- ECJ PRECEDENT, DOMESTIC POLITICS, AND EU COALITIONS (Page 533)
- The ECJ (Page 534)
- The Litigant Government (Page 535)
- Other Member Governments (Page 536)
- A STRATEGIC HISTORY OF ECJ CASE LAW (Page 537)
- Import Bans on Agricultural Products (Page 538)
- Equal Treatment of the Sexes (Page 540)
- State Liability for the Violation of EU Law (Page 544)
- History of Direct Effect (Page 544)
- The Francovich Ruling (Page 545)
- Government Responses to Francovich (Page 546)
- Toward a System of State Liability for the Violation of EU Law (Page 548)
- CONCLUSION (Page 550)
- PART VII OTHER SUBSTANTIVE AREAS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Page 553)
- 20 Scraps of Paper? Agreements and the Durability of Peace (Page 555)
- COOPERATION THEORY AND AGREEMENTS (Page 557)
- Altering Incentives (Page 560)
- Reducing Uncertainty About Actions and Intentions (Page 560)
- Controlling Accidents (Page 562)
- Political Settlement (Page 563)
- The Counterargument: Agreements Are Epiphenomenal, Merely "Scraps of Paper" (Page 564)
- METHOD: MODEL AND DATA (Page 565)
- The Econometric Model (Page 565)
- The Cease-Fires Data Set (Page 565)
- FINDINGS (Page 568)
- Baseline Prospects for Peace (Page 568)
- Agreement Strength (Page 570)
- Assessing Individual Peace Mechanisms (Page 571)
- Political Settlement (Page 579)
- CONCLUSION (Page 581)
- 21 In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO (Page 583)
- BARGAINING AND OUTCOMES IN THE GATT/WTO: TWO MODALITIES (Page 587)
- Bargaining in the Shadow of Law: Contracting for Consensus at the GATT/WTO (Page 587)
- Sovereign Equality Decision-Making Rules at the GATT/WTO (Page 587)
- Law-Based Bargaining at the GATT/WTO (Page 589)
- Bargaining in the Shadow of Power: Invisible Weighting at the GATT/WTO (Page 590)
- Relative Market Size as an Underlying Source of Bargaining Power at the GATT/WTO (Page 590)
- Power Tactics at the GATT/ WTO: Asymmetrical Contracting and Coercion (Page 592)
- TRADE ROUNDS AS CYCLES BOUNDED BY LAW-BASED AND POWER-BASED BARGAINING: LAUNCHING, AGENDA SETTING, AND CLOSING TRADE ROUNDS (Page 593)
- Launching Trade Rounds through Law-Based Bargaining (Page 593)
- Informal Agenda Setting in the Shadow of Closure (Page 594)
- The End of the Day: Power-Based Bargaining in Closing Trade Rounds – and the Cold War Context as a Constraint (Page 596)
- Closing the Tokyo Round (Page 597)
- Closing the Uruguay Round: The Single Undertaking (Page 599)
- MAINTAINING SOVEREIGN EQUALITY RULES TO GENERATE INFORMATION ABOUT THE INTERESTS OF ALL STATES (Page 600)
- CONCLUSION: THE ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY OF CONSENSUS DECISION MAKING – AND ITS LIMITS (Page 604)
- Distributive Consequences (Page 604)
- Limits on the Organized Hypocrisy of Consensus Decision (Page 605)
- Making at the GATT/WTO (Page 605)
- 22 The Legalization of International Monetary Affairs (Page 608)
- THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM BEFORE 1945: NATIONAL LAWS AND INTERNATIONAL "UNDERSTANDINGS" (Page 609)
- The Nineteenth-Century Gold Standard (Page 609)
- The Interwar Years (Page 610)
- THE IMF AND INTERNATIONAL MONETARY LAW: TOWARD THE FORMALIZATION OF "RULES OF GOOD CONDUCT" (Page 612)
- Fixed Exchange Rates: The Rise and Fall of Legalization (Page 612)
- Remaining Monetary Obligations: Article VIII (Page 613)
- LEGAL COMMITMENT: EXPECTATIONS AND EVIDENCE (Page 616)
- WHO COMPLIES? EXPLAINING THE COMPLIANCE DECISION (Page 625)
- CONCLUSION (Page 630)
- 23 Constructing an Atrocities Regime: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals (Page 634)
- IDEAS, INTERESTS, AND INSTITUTIONS (Page 635)
- THE ICTY IN BOSNIA (Page 638)
- GENOCIDE IN RWANDA (Page 642)
- THE ICTY IN KOSOVO (Page 647)
- JUSTICE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA? (Page 651)
- Cambodia (Page 651)
- Indonesia and East Timor (Page 652)
- THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (Page 653)
- EVALUATING THE ATROCITIES REGIME (Page 655)
- Formation (Page 655)
- Application (Page 657)
- Expanded Goals and Institutional Adjustments (Page 658)
- CONCLUSION (Page 660)
- 24 The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe (Page 662)
- EXISTING THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COOPERATION (Page 666)
- Interstate Power: "For Countries at the Top, This Is Predictable" (Page 666)
- Normative Persuasion: "The Inescapable Ideological Appeal of Human Rights" (Page 667)
- The "New Orthodoxy": A Curious Convergence of Realism and Idealism (Page 669)
- REPUBLICAN LIBERALISM: DEMOCRATIC PEACE AND DOMESTIC COMMITMENT (Page 672)
- TESTING THE THEORIES: THE NEGOTIATION OF THE ECHR (Page 676)
- Cross-National Variation in National Preferences (Page 677)
- The Domestic and International Decision-Making Process (Page 680)
- Domestic Deliberation and Public Justification (Page 681)
- GENERALIZING THE ARGUMENT: HUMAN RIGHTS AND BEYOND (Page 686)
- The Origin and Evolution of Human Rights Regimes (Page 686)
- Generalizing the Theory to Other Issue Areas (Page 689)
- Realism and Idealism in International Relations Theory (Page 691)
- 25 Regime Design Matters: Intentional Oil Pollution and Treaty Compliance (Page 693)
- COMPLIANCE THEORY AND DEFINITIONS (Page 695)
- TWO SUBREGIMES FOR INTERNATIONAL OIL POLLUTION CONTROL (Page 698)
- The Discharge Subregime (Page 699)
- The Equipment Subregime (Page 701)
- OBSERVED COMPLIANCE LEVELS (Page 703)
- WAS COMPLIANCE TREATY-INDUCED? (Page 706)
- LOT (Page 706)
- COW (Page 707)
- SBT (Page 709)
- MECHANISMS OF INFLUENCE (Page 711)
- Enhancing Transparency (Page 711)
- Facilitating Potent but Low-Cost Sanctions (Page 715)
- Building on Existing Institutions (Page 718)
- Coercing Compliance Rather than Deterring Violation (Page 719)
- CONCLUSION (Page 721)
- 26 The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources (Page 724)
- EXPLAINING NORM CHANGE: THE RISE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS IN PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES (Page 728)
- The Common Heritage System (Page 730)
- The Demise of the Common Heritage System (Page 733)
- Biodiversity and Bioprospecting (Page 734)
- The Legalization of Property Rights (Page 736)
- REGIME COMPLEXES AND THE STUDY OF REGIMES (Page 739)
- No Clean Slate (Page 740)
- Forum Shopping (Page 743)
- Legal Consistency (Page 743)
- Regime Development Through Implementation (Page 745)
- CONCLUSION (Page 748)
- References (Page 751)
- Index (Page 753)